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Florida courts experienced an unusually active period during the
last survey year, handing down a large number of significant opinions
in the area of torts. Of these, the Florida Supreme Court's doctrinally
sound and well-reasoned opinion in First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max
Mitchell & Co.' led the way. Mitchell, an accountant, attempted to
negotiate a loan from the bank on behalf of his client, C.M. Systems
(C.M.). Mitchell showed the bank audited financial statements of
C.M., which he had prepared, indicating that C.M. had no liability to
any bank. Mitchell, in the course of oral negotiations, reaffirmed that
C.M. owed no money to any bank. Ultimately, the bank extended a
$500,000 line of credit to C.M. which C.M. fully utilized and never
repaid. The bank later discovered that at the time Mitchell prepared
the audited statement and made the oral representations, C.M. owed
over $750,000 to a number of banks.2
The bank sued Mitchell, the trial court granted summary judg-
ment to Mitchell, and the Second District Court of Appeal uneasily
affirmed, believing itself bound by precedent to dismiss any claim
against an accountant brought by a person not in privity.' Granting
certiorari to review a question of great public importance, the Florida
Supreme Court reversed:,
Because of the heavy reliance upon audited financial statements in
the contemporary financial world, we believe permitting recovery
only from those in privity or near privity is unduly restrictive. On
the other hand, we are persuaded by the wisdom of the rule which
limits liability to those persons or classes of persons whom an ac-
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1. 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990).
2. Id. at 10-11.
3. First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 541 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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countant "knows" will rely on his opinion rather than those he
"should have known" would do so because it takes into account the
fact that an accountant controls neither his client's accounting
records nor the distribution of his reports.4
Particularly impressive in Justice Grimes' literate opinion was his
handling of the formative cases written by Justice Cardozo, then sitting
on the New York Court of Appeals. Most courts focus on the directly
relevant Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven,5 in which an accounting
firm was held not liable for negligently auditing a financial statement
when sued by plaintiffs not in privity. However, Justice Grimes went
further and recognized that any discussion of Ultramares is incomplete
without a collateral consideration of Cardozo's earlier opinion in
Glanzer v. Shepard.6 In that case, a public weigher, hired by the seller
of beans, was contractually bound to transmit the weight of the beans
not only to the seller, but to the buyer as well. When the beans arrived
weighing less than the certificate indicated, the buyer sued the weigher
even though no privity of contract existed between the two. As the
weigher actually knew of the buyer's existence, he incurred liability for
his misstatement despite the lack of privity.1
Justice Grimes correctly noted that privity of contract between a
professional and one injured by that professional's malpractice nor-
mally forms an integral part of the plaintiffs cause of action.8 How-
ever, Justice Grimes added that the plaintiff can also satisfy the duty
proven by privity through a showing that the defendant knew his or her
acts would necessarily affect the plaintiff as well as persons in privity
with the professional.9 Stressing the uniqueness of the facts in the in-
stant case, Justice Grimes concluded that "Mitchell vouched for the
integrity of the audits and that his conduct in dealing with the bank
sufficed to meet the requirements of the rule which we have adopted in
this opinion."' 10
4. First Florida Bank, 558 So. 2d at 15.
5. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
6. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
7. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
8. First Florida Bank, 558 So. 2d at 16.
9. Id.
10. Id. A lower court, however, noted that privity would bar a suit by a member
of the public at large against a physician who approved of a psychotic patient's return
to work as a member of the police force. See Joseph v. Shafey, 15 Fla. L. Weekly
D2343 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1990).
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The Florida Supreme Court also decided Upjohn Co. v.
MacMurdo,"1 which clarified the often difficult task of determining the
adequacy of warnings in cases involving products liability. Upjohn
manufactured the contraceptive pharmaceutical, Depo-Provera, with
which MacMurdo was injected by her physician. The insert in the
Depo-Provera package warned that the drug might cause vaginal
bleeding. 12 MacMurdo, after a second injection of Depo-Provera, ex-
perienced continual vaginal bleeding which ultimately resulted in her
doctor performing a hysterectomy. MacMurdo sued Upjohn, and at
trial the judge permitted the issue of the adequacy of the warning to go
to the jury. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, 13 but on
conflict certiorari the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
warnings were so "accurate, clear, and unambiguous" the judge should
have found them adequate as a matter of law.14
The plaintiff's experts failed to demonstrate "that the package in-
sert was insufficient to put a doctor on notice that the symptoms...
could result from the use of Depo-Provera."' 5 Although MacMurdo's
bleeding was more than the breakthrough bleeding or spotting men-
tioned in the package insert, the company did not have the duty to
warn specifically of the degree of blood flow the product might in-
duce.' 6 Thus, the test for adequacy of warnings after Upjohn Co. seems
to be whether the warning would adequately convey the danger to the
person the warning was designed to reach. As Upjohn Co. dealt with
warnings to a learned intermediary, the warnings needed to convey the
danger to that intermediary. In cases of direct consumer warnings, a
judge can take the issue of warnings from the jury if the warnings
11. 562 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1990).
12. The package insert specifically warned of vaginal bleeding in several sections,
with the clearest statement coming in the "Adverse Reactions" portion, which noted:
"The following adverse reactions have been observed in women taking progestin includ-
ing Depo-Provera: breakthrough bleeding[,] spotting[, and] change in menstrual flow
." Id. at 682.
13. Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 536 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
14. Upjohn Co., 562 So. 2d at 683 (quoting Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540
So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1989)).
15. Id.
16. "It would be unreasonable to hold Upjohn liable for not characterizing the
bleeding as excessive, continuous, or prolonged." Id. In dissent, Justice Shaw argued
that because Upjohn knew prolonged bleeding had resulted from Depo-Provera and
because the physician anticipated lack of bleeding rather than increased bleeding, the
package insert should have been more specific and the jury could have found it was
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clearly conveyed the danger to the person purchasing the product. 17
In 1987, in Bankston v. Brennan,8 the court determined that a
social host could not be liable to a third party injured by a minor guest
who had become intoxicated at the host's home. This year, in Dowell v.
Gracewood Fruit Co.,19 it faced the issue of damages caused by an
inebriated guest served alcoholic beverages by a host who knew the
guest was a chronic alcoholic. Gracewood Fruit employed Abbey, and
knew that he suffered from alcoholism. At a company outing, Abbey
drank alcoholic beverages and later caused an automobile accident in-
juring Dowell. Dowell sued Gracewood, the trial court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.20 Dowell then obtained certiorari from the
Florida Supreme Court based on a question of great public interest.
The court clarified its 1987 opinion in Bankston, stating that
"[w]hile Dowell attempts to characterize Bankston as only deciding the
liability for serving alcoholic beverages to a minor, the opinion unmis-
takably rejected the contention that section 768.125 created a cause of
action against a social host."'" The court continued to stress that in
matters where the legislature has spoken, any variation from the lan-
guage of the statute must rest with the legislature itself.22 Again the
court demonstrates that while it might willingly change judge-made
law, it will continue to defer to the legislature in any ca;e where the
legislature has not specifically covered a situation within the bounds of
an existing general statute.23
These three cases, although coming from different fields of tort
17. See 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.7 at 378
nn.27-30 (2d ed. 1986).
18. 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
19. 559 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1990). Florida statutes impose liability on a "person
who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is
not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the
use of any or all alcoholic beverages .... " FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1989) (emphasis
supplied). Bankston dealt with the first clause of the statute; Dowell addressed the
second.
20. Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 544 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
21. Dowell, 559 So. 2d at 218.
22. As the legislature had not addressed the subject since the court decided
Bankston, the court concluded that "the legislature is content with our interpretation of
the statute." Id.
23. See generally Richmond, 1988 Survey of Florida Law (Torts), 13 NOVA L.
REV. 1245, 1247-48 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Tort Survey].
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law, seem to signal a resurgence of concentration by the Florida Su-
preme Court on the duty element of tort law. First Florida Bank cer-
tainly stresses the requirement that the defendants must owe a duty to
the plaintiffs who sue them. The entire concept of privity arose as an
alternative means of expressing the necessity for a prior, litigatable re-
lationship between two parties in order for one to successfully pursue a
tort action against the other.24 Upjohn Co., in permitting the judge -
instead of the jury - to decide clear-cut matters, treats the question of
warnings in a duty-oriented manner instead of a causation-oriented
one.2 5 Finally, Dowell stresses that in the absence of common-law du-
ties and a clearly defined legislatively created duty, the court will take
no steps to enlarge on a highly specific, limited duty the legislature
may have enacted. The concentration on the necessity for plaintiffs to
demonstrate duty reaffirms Florida's continuing approval of the princi-
ples espoused by Justice Cardozo in the misrepresentation cases and
embodied in the famous Palsgraf opinion. 6
II. NEGLIGENCE
A. Negligence Per Se
Courts confronted with plaintiffs attempting to prove negligence
through violation of a statute occasionally must cope with the effect a
violation of an administrative regulation will have in a civil suit. This
has proven a knotty issue, particularly when the regulating agency is
not of the same state as the court hearing the issue. Courts have split
on the dignity to accord the regulation.27 Dicta in the recent Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal decision in Murray v. Briggs28 indicates that
Florida courts will not accord federal regulations the same status as
Florida statutes and ordinances. Briggs ran his pick-up truck into the
rear of a parked flat bed truck owned by Hughes Supply. Briggs' pas-
senger, Murray, sued Hughes, arguing that the truck was used in inter-
state commerce and its violation of a safety regulation promulgated by
24. See generally Richmond, The Development of Duty: Langridge to Palsgraf,
31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 903, 940-43 (1987).
25. The judge decides questions of duty; the jury decides questions of causation.
See generally 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 16 (2d ed.
1986).
26. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
27. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
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the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) proximately caused his
injuries.29 At trial, the court refused to instruct the jury on Hughes'
failure to have a rear bumper which met the I.C.C. regulation. The
jury found for Hughes, and Murray appealed to the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, which affirmed.30
Judge Griffin's opinion actually turns on the determination that
Hughes was not engaged in interstate commerce and that the regula-
tion did not apply to its trucks.3 1 However, Judge Griffin went on to
note that even had the regulation applied to Hughes, the trial judge
correctly refused to give the requested instruction: "[A]lthough several
courts seem comfortable with the concept, we are not satisfied that a
federal regulation should necessarily control state law questions of neg-
ligence by enlarging common law duties or creating new duties. '3 2 Ac-
cording to the court, the regulation itself fails to provide definite stan-
dards for the design of the bumper, and in fact does not even specify
the proper location of the bumper. Furthermore, a court cannot permit




Two significant opinions from the Third District Court of Appeal
solidified the rule that employers will not incur vicarious liability for
the acts of their employees in driving to and from work, even though
those same acts might entitle the employees to workers' compensation
benefits. In the first opinion, the wife of the president of a corporation
also served as a part-time employee of the corporation.3 4 The corpora-
29. See Rear End Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 393.86 (1989). This regulation pro-
vides that vehicles engaged in interstate commerce must have rear bumpers meeting
certain specifications designed for the protection of other vehicles in rear-end collisions.
Murray alleged that Hughes' bumper failed to meet the specific requirements of the
regulation. Murray, 569 So. 2d at 478.
30. Id. at 481.
31. Although Hughes engaged in interstate trading, it had two fleets of trucks.
The truck in question was used exclusively in intrastate transactions within Florida. Id.
at 479-80.
32. Id. at 480.
33. Id. at 481.
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tion was a franchise of United Comsumers Club (UCC), and admit-
tedly the agent of UCC. The corporation provided its president with a
van, which his family was entitled to use. One day, the president called
his wife to request that. she come in to work. While driving the corpora-
tion's van, she caused an accident which injured Robelo. Robelo sued
UCC, arguing that the wife's actions caused UCC to incur vicarious
liability.35
The trial court granted UCC's motion for summary judgment, and
the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.3 6 Robelo attempted to use
two theories of liability, both of which the court rejected. He first ar-
gued that the wife's travel subjected UCC to liability either because it
was in the nature of a special errand or because she was an "on call"
employee. The court rejected the first prong of the argument simply
because the facts demonstrated that she "was merely traveling to the
office," 37 and the second because even though she did not work unless
needed, her employment relationship did not require her to come in
each time she was summoned. As to the second theory, even though the
corporation provided the van which she drove, since she was allowed to
drive it for other purposes than business the simple use of the van with-
out a specific employment connection would not subject the employer
to liability. 38
In the second opinion, the Third District Court joined with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in noting the difference between the
workers' compensation test for "course of employment" and the respon-
deat superior test for "scope of employment." 39 In Sussman v. Florida
East Coast Properties, Inc.,4 the manager of a health spa called
Paraiso, one of his fitness instructors, and asked her to stop on her way
to work and pick up a birthday cake for another employee. She bought
the cake, testifying later that she did so without regard to her man-
ager's instructions.4 As she drove from the supermarket, the cake be-
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id. at 397.
37. Id. at 396.
38. Id. at 397.
39. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Akin, 533 So. 2d 829, 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (Anstead, J., concurring specially); see also 1988 Tort Survey, supra note 23, at
1255-56.
40. 557 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
41. "[W] e were friends, like aerobics teachers and fitness instructors and we just
decided to give him a cake because it was his birthday .... I didn't do it because it
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gan to slip from the seat next to her. She reached for the cake and lost
control of the car, which careened into Sussman as he sat on a bus
bench. Sussman sued Paraiso's employer and appealed to the Third
District Court of Appeal when the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 2
On appeal, Sussman argued that Paraiso's unquestioned entitle-
ment to workers' compensation benefits also demonstrated that she ac-
ted within the scope of her employment for purposes of vicarious liabil-
ity.4" The appellate court disagreed. According to the court, different
policy considerations govern workers' compensation qualification than
govern vicarious liability. Respondeat superior demands a "narrower
analysis.""' Thus, even though Paraiso "was enroute to her place of
employment . . . she was outside the scope of the employer's business
as a matter of law."' 5 As noted in an earlier survey of tort law, the
reasoning adopted by the these two district courts of appeal has the
firmest base in logic, and the rule they have stated should take prece-
dence over conflicting cases from other districts. 6
2. Borrowed Servants
Two cases during the last survey year cast new light on the inter-
face between workers' compensation immunity and suits by borrowed
servants. The Florida Supreme Court determined conclusively that the
lending employer of a negligent worker can block a suit by the em-
ployee of the borrowing employer, based on workers' compensation im-
munity. In Halifax Paving, Inc. v. Scott & Jobalia Construction Co.,"7
Halifax gratuitously loaned a crane and operator to the Scott &
Jobalia Construction Co. (S & J). Obeying hand signals from S & J's
employees, the Halifax operator attempted to move pipe by using a
sling attached to the crane. The pipe slipped from the sling and injured
Grier, an employee of S & J. Grier collected workers' compensation
benefits from S & J, and then sued Halifax, seeking damages on a
respondeat superior theory. After a jury found that the operator was a
42. Id. at 75.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court relied on the nature of the errand - purchasiIg refreshments
for a social occasion - as well as Paraiso's statement that the purchase was not work-
related to determine that the trip was outside the scope of her employment. Id.
46. See 1988 Tort Survey, supra note 23, at 1256.
47. 565 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1990).
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borrowed servant and held in favor of Grier, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal reversed, finding the lending employer was entitled to the work-
ers' compensation immunity accorded to the borrowing employer.48 The
Florida Supreme Court granted conflict certiorari4 9 and approved the
Fifth District Court's opinion.
The crane operator, working under the specific control of S & J's
employee, was a borrowed servant. Since prior opinions establish that
leased equipment becomes "the working tool of the employer,' 50 inju-
ries caused by use of the equipment are exclusively remedied through
the workers' compensation process. The court reasoned that if the
owner of leased dangerous equipment can claim workers' compensation
immunity, it seems only logical that the owner of loaned dangerous
equipment can claim the immunity as well.51 Although the owner of
the crane "certainly had no duty to provide worker's compensation to
the injured party, neither did the third party [owner] in any logical
sense contribute to the work-place injury that actually occurred. '52
In Maxson v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.,53 the First District
Court of Appeal considered the obverse side of the borrowed servant
coin - whether an injured employee can successfully sue a borrowing
employer in negligence, or is limited to workers' compensation reme-
dies. Project Construction furnished manpower to Air Products under
an agreement providing that Project would pay the workers and Air
Products would reimburse Project. Maxson worked under this agree-
ment for a period of time, but then requested a transfer to a different
job, supervised exclusively by Air Products' personnel, and which of-
fered him a significantly higher chance of promotion. Maxson was in-
jured on the job, and sued Air Products in negligence. The trial court
reserved ruling on Air Products' motion to dismiss and, after a jury
verdict for Maxson, set aside the verdict. The First District Court of
48. Scott & Jobalia Constr. Co. v. Halifax Paving, Inc., 538 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
49. The First District Court of Appeal had reached a contrary result in Mann v.
Pensacola Concrete Constr. Co., 448 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 461 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1984).
50. See Smith v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., 182 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1966).
51. Halifax Paving, 565 So. 2d at 1347.
52. Id. at 1348. The court also discussed the function of the workers' compensa-
tion remedy: "[T]he central policies of worker's compensation are to provide employees
with a swift and adequate means of compensation for injury, and to insulate employers
from potentially bankrupting tort liability for work-place accidents." Id. at 1347.
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Appeal affirmed.54
The testimony at trial conclusively demonstrated that Maxson was
doing work exclusively to benefit Air Products, and performing his du-
ties exclusively under the control of Air Products' employees. Regard-
less of the contractual relationship between the two employers, the
court had to look at the actual employment relationship governing the
employee. Even though there was no specific contract between Maxson
and Air Products, the facts clearly demonstrated that the "work being
done ...was essentially that of the special employer, and ... that
the special employer had the right to control the details of the work."55
Thus, Air Products was the de facto special employer of Maxson, and
entitled to raise workers' compensation immunity as a defense to the
suit.516
C. Defenses
The Florida Supreme Court decided two significant cases dealing
with different defenses to actions in negligence. In one, the court re-
fused to permit workers' compensation immunity to block a suit alleg-
ing sexual harassment. 57 In the other, the court attempted to further
define the distinction between express assumption of risk and implied
assumption of risk.58 The assumption of risk case did little more than
further cement the Blackburn v. Dorta59 fallacious treatment of as-
sumption of risk into Florida law. The sexuil harassment case, how-
ever, may have paved the way for substantial inroads into workers'
compensation immunity in the limited case of intentional torts.
A number of Richardson-Greenfields' female employees exper-
ienced frequent sexual advances, both verbal and physical, from male
employees. They sued the company, claiming various intentional torts
and sought damages for the emotional distress and humiliation occa-
sioned by the sexual harassment. The company moved to dismiss the
suit, arguing that the plaintiffs' sole remedy lay in workers' compensa-
tion. The trial court granted the motion and the Second District Court
54. Id. at 1213-14.
55. Id. at 1213 (citing Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.. 246 So. 2d 98,
101 (Fla. 1971)).
56. Id. at 1214.
57. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla.
1989).
58. Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian, 550 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1989).
59. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
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* of Appeal affirmed." The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the issue as one of great public interest.6 '
The workers' compensation statute provides an exclusive remedy
for any "injury or death" arising in the course of employment, but per-
mits tort suits against employers for damages other than those arising
from injury or death. 2 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court first had to
determine whether the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs in
Byrd constituted an injury within the meaning of the statute. The
workers' compensation statute has been liberally construed in the past,
and courts have read the definitional sections to include damage-caus-
ing occurrences so that workers would not go without a remedy for
their harm. 3 However, the inclusion of sexual harrasment claims in
workers' compensation actions would work to frustrate legislative in-
tent. As the Byrd court noted, "both the state of Florida and the fed-
eral government have committed themselves strongly to outlawing and
eliminating sexual discrimination in the workplace, including the re-
lated evil of sexual harassment."6 4 An examination of the various stat-
utes enacted by the Florida legislature supports the conclusion that the
courts should read statutes to effectuate this policy of doing away with
sexual harassment in employment. To permit an employer the shield of
workers' compensation immunity would run contrary to all existing
Florida law.6 5 Thus, the complaint alleged an injury not protected by
the workers' compensation statute - one "to intangible personal
rights. 66
The Florida Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the ex-
clusivity of the workers' compensation remedy will bar suits based on
intentional torts. Byrd will give no guidance in those instances where
60. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 527 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
61. The certified question read: "Whether the workers' compensation statute pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for a claim based on sexual harassment in the workplace."
Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1100.
62. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1987).
63. See, e.g., W.T. Edwards Hosp. v. Rakestraw, 114 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) (worker injured by co-worker in brawl over a love affair entitled to
compensation).
64. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1102.
65. "Public policy now requires that employers be held accountable in tort for
the sexually harassing environments they permit to exist, whether the tort claim is
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plaintiffs claim damages for physical injury or death.6 7 However, where
a plaintiff claims emotional damages or nominal damages due to an
intentional tort, it would seem that the plaintiff seeks to remedy harm
to the very intangible rights of which the Florida Supreme Court spoke.
Thus, Byrd should open the door to substantial claims involving puni-
tive damages against employers, but only for intentional torts not in-
volving personal injury.
With Blackburn v. Dorta68 in 1977, the Florida Supreme Court
drew the distinction between "strict assumption of the risk" and "quali-
fied assumption of the risk." The court reiterated this reasoning in
Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian,9 stating again the hypothetical situation
it used in Blackburn:
The tenant returns from work to find the premises on fire with his
infant child trapped inside. He rushes in to save the child and is
burned in the fire. Under the pure or strict doctrine of assumption
of risk, the tenant is precluded from recovery because he volunta-
rily exposed himself to a known risk even though his conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances.70
Unfortunately, the very example given by the court demonstrates the
lack of distinction the court seeks to draw. Can we truly say the act of
saving one's own child from a burning building is voluntary in nature?
One commentator argues that
[w]here the defendant puts [the plaintiff] to a choice of evils, there
is a species of duress, which destroys the idea of freedom of elec-
tion .. . .Those who dash in to save their own property, or the
lives or property of others, from a peril created by the defendant's
negligence, do not assume the risk where the alternative is to allow
the threatened harm to occur.
7 1
67. In Fisher v. Shenandoah General Construction Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla.
1986), the Florida Supreme Court procedurally declined to consider the effect of work-
ers' compensation on intentional tort claims. However, in Fisher the plaintiff died as
the result of an intentional industrial accident. Byrd would have no effect on a case of
this nature. See generally Richmond, 1986 Survey of Florida Law (Torts), 11 NOVA L.
REV. 1519, 1535-37 (1987).
68. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
69. 550 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1989).
70. Id. at 1115 (emphasis supplied).
71. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TH LAW OF TORTS
490-91 (5th ed. 1984).
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Thus, there is no true distinction between the two types of assumption
of risk perceived by the Florida Supreme Court. Carrying the logic fur-
ther, with the breakdown of the logic underlying Blackburn v. Dorta,
the Florida Supreme Court's decision to merge assumption of the risk
in with comparative negligence also fails.
Mazzeo presents a clear example of the evils of the rule espoused
in Blackburn. An experienced swimmer, after standing in the shallow
water at the base of a platform at a municipal lake, and after hearing
the warnings of her boyfriend that the water was too shallow to permit
diving, dove headfirst off the platform.72 She broke her neck and sued
the city which maintained the park. There were no signs warning swim-
mers not to dive, but there was a faded statement reading "no diving"
painted on the dock itself. The trial court permitted the jury to con-
sider whether Mazzeo had assumed the risk. The jury found the city
negligent, but also found that Mazzeo knew perfectly well the risk in
diving from the platform "and having had a reasonable opportunity to
avoid it, voluntarily and deliberately exposed herself to the danger by
diving into the water."" On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed.74 The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari, as the
case involved a matter of great public iriterest, and reversed.
The court first reviewed Blackburn, and then discussed the ex-
tremely limited exception it had carved out for cases involving assump-
tion of the risks for participation in contact sports. 5 It then refused to
extend the exception to the instant case: "To expand this exception to
include aberrant conduct in noncontact sports collides with the merger
of assumption of risk into comparative negligence . . -76 Yet the
court willingly characterized Mazzeo's behavior as "foolhardy con-
duct. ' 77 To permit a jury to award damages in such a situation, partic-
ularly where the plaintiff's conduct rises to the level of recklessness in
comparison with the defendant's mere negligence, seems contrary to
the concepts of fault which underlie our system of tort law. Justice
McDonald, joined by Justice Overton, also found problems with the
majority's opinion. They, however, would have avoided the Blackburn
72. Although conflicting evidence existed, these are the facts taken in the light
most favorable to the losing party - the defendant. Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1114.
73. Id.
74. Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian, 526 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
75. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
76. Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1116.
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problem by holding that the city's failure to post signs (lid not cause
Mazzeo's harm since her deliberate and intentional conduct would have
broken any claimed causal nexus.7 8
D. Causation
1. Generally
An interesting and troubling case from the Second District Court
of Appeal presented the question of the adequacy of a plaintiff's proof
on the issue of foreseeability. In Florida Power Corp. v. McCain,7" the
blade of a mechanical trencher severed a subsurface power line, injur-
ing the trencher's operator. He sued the power company, and testimony
at trial demonstrated that the company had designed the power line to
deenergize the moment it was severed. A power company employee also
testified that he knew of no instance in an eight year period when the
person who severed a power cable received an electric shock. The plain-
tiff presented no other evidence on the issue. The defendant moved for
a directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found
for the plaintiff. The Second District Court of Appeal .reversed.s0
In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defend-
ant could have foreseen the harm which occurred. A judge may prop-
erly determine the issue of foreseeability, or causation, although nor-
mally the court should submit it to the jury. The court found that if a
plaintiff fails to produce evidence that the defendant could have antici-
pated the type of harm which the plaintiff suffered, the court should
take the issue of foreseeability from the jury.81 From the limited proof
adduced by the plaintiff at trial, he failed to demonstrate "that Florida
Power reasonably could have foreseen any injury -resulting from a
trencher severing this type of power cable."8 2
Judge Threadgill, in dissent, would have left the issue of foresee-
ability in the case to the jury. Quoting from the trial court's opinion
denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Threadgill noted that a jury
should have determined whether "Florida Power could not foresee that
if an insulated electrical line carrying 7,200 volts of electrcity were cut
by a mechanical device the operator of the device might receive an
78. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
79. 555 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
80. Id. at 1269-70.
81. Id. at 1271.
82. Id. at 1270.
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electrical shock and an accompanying injury.""3 Indeed, the majority's
opinion leaves behind a nagging doubt. If Florida Power had designed
the power line to deenergize upon being severed, it must have had some
concern that severing the line would cause a shock to the person caus-
ing the break were the line not deenergized. In other words, Florida
Power's own actions demonstrated it actually foresaw the possibility of
this type of harm occurring. If the "fail-safe" mechanism failed to dee-
nergize the line, then the electric shock could have readily resulted.
The fact that the employee knew of no instances of electrocution does
not mean that Florida Power could not have foreseen the type of harm,
but it might permit a jury to find Florida Power had taken reasonable
care to prevent the harm.
2. Superseding Intervening Causes
In the last year, courts have begun to deal with questions involving
the conduct of plaintiffs not as a defense, but as a superseding interven-
ing cause which will destroy the causal nexus between the act of the
defendant and the injury to the plaintiff. The dissent in Mazzeo sug-
gested this approach with a plaintiff who had acted intentionally. s4 Dis-
trict courts of appeal have also determined that a plaintiffs negligence
might supersede that of the defendant. Although one cannot at this
early point identify these cases as creating a trend, they do tend to
show the germ of a dissatisfaction by intermediate Florida courts with
the merger of assumption of risk into comparative negligence.
For example, in Garcia v. Metropolitan Dade County, 5 a mother
was walking to school with her child. When they came upon an inter-
section, the child walked out into the street without his mother's per-
mission. The county had not maintained a crosswalk at the intersection
even though it had suggested the intersection as a safe one for children
going to school. The child stopped in the middle of the intersection, and
a car struck and injured him. He and his parents sued the county. The
trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant, and the Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed.86
The court emphasized that had the county maintained traffic sig-
nals, the boy still would have been injured:
83. Id. at 1272 (Threadgill, J., dissenting).
84. See supra text accompanying note 78.
85. 561 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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No number of traffic signals, traffic control devices, or safe route to
school maps can provide any greater protection for a child than the
attendant supervision of his parent. . . .The sole proximate cause
of George's injuries was his act of stepping into the street without
keeping a proper lookout, while under his mother's control.87
Thus, the negligence of the parent and child combined to supercede
any possible negligence of the county in failing to provide proper safety
precautions at the intersection.
A later panel of the Third District Court of Appeal, however,
reached a contrary result where the child's parent did not accompany
the child.88 An additional distinction lay in the special instructions
given to that plaintiff regarding the route to school, and in the plain-
tiff's special status. Lagarian Brunson needed a speech therapist, and
the Dade School Board transferred him to a school some distance from
his home. The school board failed to provide a school bus for Lagarian,
and his father took him to school via public transportation by a route
designated by the school board. The route involved crossing a danger-
ous city intersection. After two weeks, the nine-year old boy's father
ceased to accompany him. As Lagarian crossed the intersection, a car
struck and killed him.89
In the ensuing action by Lagarian's estate, the school board ac-
knowledged that it had breached a duty to provide transportation to the
new school. However, it moved for and was granted summary judgment
on the theory that the father's intervening negligent act of failing to
accompany his son on the dangerous trip superseded any breach of
duty in failing to provide the school bus. On appeal, the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed. 90
Were it not for the failure to provide transportation, the father
would not have had the opportunity to act negligently. Since his "alleg-
edly deficient conduct 'was set in motion by the original wrongful act'
[it was] not such a new and independent cause as to create an interven-
ing cause."91 Yet the question remains open whether, had the father
accompanied the child to the intersection and negligently permitted
him to attempt to cross the street, the second panel from the Third
87. Id.
88. See Brunson v. Dade County School Board, 559 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
89. Id. at 647.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
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District would have found the father's negligence superseded that of
the school board.
Later in the year, the First District Court of Appeal found that
the act of a man in attempting to board a moving freight train consti-
tuted a superseding intervening cause, relieving the railroad company
of any liability for his injuries. 2 Pickard, a man who traveled from
place to place by hitchhiking or hopping a moving freight train and
subsisted by working odd jobs, asked two men he believed to be rail-
road company employees where he could hop a train. They directed
him to a bridge over the tracks. After some equivocating, and having
left the premises of the railroad and then returning, Pickard made up
his mind to jump a train. As he approached the tracks in the rain, a
train came towards him at about 30 miles per hour. He tried to hop the
train, but was instead thrown from it when it suddenly lurched. Pickard
sustained severe injuries. He sued the railroad company and success-
fully won a jury verdict after the trial court denied the company's mo-
tion to dismiss. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal
reversed.9"
After a lengthy discussion of Pickard's status as trespasser or li-
censee, the court considered whether the acts of the railroad company
employees caused Pickard's injuries at law.94 Although the employees
may have been the cause in fact of the injuries in directing Pickard to
the bridge crossing, their acts were not the cause at law of the injuries.
"[T]he inquiry becomes whether the negligence of FEC's employees set
in motion the chain of events leading to Pickard's injuries or simply
provided the occasion for Pickard's own gross negligence. '"" Stressing
Pickard's own lack of resolve and the extreme danger of his attempt to
board the fast freight in bad weather, the court held his actions consti-
tuted "an active, independent and efficient intervening cause that sev-
ered the tenuous chain of causation between the negligence of FEC's
employees and Pickard's injuries."9
The utilization of proximate causation to limit the liability of de-
fendants to plaintiffs who take unusual risks, or whose injuries come
92. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Pickard, 573 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
93. Id. at 852-53.
94. The court seems to have assumed that Pickard's identification of the two men
as employees of the railroad sufficed to send that issue to the jury, which found in
Pickard's favor.
95. Id. at 858.
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about due to negligence occurring subsequent to that of the named de-
fendant, seems a natural development. Intentional torts have always su-
perseded negligence, although when the intentional act was that of the
plaintiff courts have spoken of it in terms of assumptior of the risk.
The rationale of both doctrines is the same: a defendant incurs liability
only for those injuries which one can anticipate at the time of the negli-
gent conduct. At law, one cannot anticipate an intervening intentional
harmful act - whether the act jeopardizes third parties or the plain-
tiffs themselves.
E. Premises Liability
1. Dangerous Interior Conditions
The nature of proof required of the plaintiff in a slip and fall case
provided the basis for two district court of appeal opinions this past
year. In the first, the plaintiff slipped on a foreign substance on the
floor of a grocery store. 7 At trial, she introduced no evidence that the
store's employees caused the material to fall to the floor, and also pro-
duced nothing to demonstrate that they knew the material was there.
Additionally, she produced nothing indicating the length of time the
substance had been on the floor before she slipped on it. Despite her
lack of evidence, the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss at
the close of the plaintiff's case and sent the case to the jury. The jury
found for the plaintiff, but on appeal, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal reversed.98
The court explained that a plaintiff in a slip and fall case can re-
cover from the owner of the premises by demonstrating that the owner
failed to use due care, either in keeping foreign materials from the floor
or in removing them within a reasonable period of time.9 As to the
second alternative, the plaintiff can show either that the owner knew of
the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it, or that the owner
should have known of the dangerous condition because, in the exercise
of due care, the owner would have discovered it within the period of
time it had existed. Where the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence dem-
onstrating any of these three ways the owner failed to exercise reasona-
97. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 214-15.
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ble care, the plaintiff cannot reach the jury. Any jury determination in
the absence of this evidence would be mere speculation. 100
The second case, from the Second District Court of Appeal, ac-
corded with the first.'01 Wilson, shopping in a supermarket, returned to
an aisle he had visited shortly before. He slipped on some liquid deter-
gent on the floor, which had spilled from a tipped-over bottle on the top
shelf, and injured himself. On his earlier trip down the aisle, he had not
seen any detergent on the floor. Wilson sued the supermarket. At trial,
the store manager testified that he had inspected the aisle no more than
fifteen minutes prior to the accident and had not noticed any spill. The
case went to the jury, and after it rendered a verdict in Wilson's favor,
the trial judge granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed: "Appellants' case fails in
its required burden of proof for lack of any evidence that appellee had
actual knowledge of a dangerous condition prior to Mr. Wilson's injury.
There is likewise no evidence as to the length of time a dangerous con-
dition existed prior to Mr. Wilson's fall."'0 2
In Fitzgerald v. Cestari,0 3 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
determined that a homeowner has no duty to discover whether a sliding
glass door contains safety or plate glass, and the Supreme Court of
Florida later affirmed. 0 4 Brandi Fitzgerald, visiting a house owned by
the Cestaris, walked through a plate glass door and suffered severe in-
juries. When she sued the Cestaris, the trial judge granted their motion
100. Id. at 215. The court continued:
Where, as here, there is no evidence the premises possessor had actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition prior to the injury, and there is no
evidence as to the length of time the dangerous condition existed prior to
the injury, the premises possessor is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law and a jury is not authorized to speculate or arbitrarily impose strict
liability based on the mere contention or general assertiorl that the prem-
ises possessor "should have known of" the dangerous condition.
Id.
101. Wilson v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 559 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
102. Id. at 263-64.
103. 553 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
104. Fitzgerald v. Cestari, 569 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1990). The Florida Supreme
Court echoed the rationale of the Fourth District. This case presents the difficulty the
author of a survey faces when a case during the survey year is considered by a superior
tribunal in an opinion which appears subsequent to the survey year. The author of this
survey has elected to preserve the integrity of the survey year, but notes the later af-
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for summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed. The Cestaris
had submitted to the trial court an affidavit demonstrating they had no
knowledge that the glass door, which was the same one installed by the
builders of the house, contained plate glass rather than safety glass.
The affidavit also noted that a reasonable inspection would not have
disclosed the type of glass in the door. The court held that under these
circumstances, the owner of the house had no duty to go beyond a rea-
sonable inspection to determine the nature of the glass. Although the
plaintiff had a cause of action against the original builder of the
house, 105 she had no cause of action against the owners. 10 6
The First District Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the
duty owed by the owner of a building to those individuals working to
correct a dangerous condition within the building.10 7 Champion owned
a pre-world war II building and hired Brown & Root to demolish it.
Brown & Root subcontracted the removal of asbestos to A & A Insula-
tion, and Mozee worked for A & A. During the course of removal, A
& A's superintendent asked Champion to turn off the electricity to the
building, but Champion's contact person could not comply with this
request. He told the superintendent that there were no schematics for
much of the old wiring, and A & A should assume the wiring was still
hot. Mozee was working in a part of the building with charged wires,
grasped a wire, and was electrocuted. His estate sued Champion, which
recovered a summary final judgment from the trial court, and the
plaintiff appealed to the First District Court of Appeal." 8
The owner of property incurs liability to independent contractors
working on the property only if the owner intermeddles with the work,
or if the owner creates or approves of a dangerous condition on the
property. Even though Champion did not attempt to take control of the
work performed by A & A, Mozee's estate argued that Champion ap-
proved of the dangerous condition in failing to give adequate warning.
However, the district court agreed with the trial judge, who concluded
that "under the circumstances Champion adequately informed the con-
tractor of the existence of electrical lines in the building and to assume
105. See, e.g., Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
106. Fitzgerald, 553 So. 2d at 709. Florida law seems to run contrary to that of
some other jurisdictions, noted by Judge Dell in his exhaustively researched dissent. Id.
at 709-12 (Dell, J., dissenting).
107. Mozee v. Champion Int'l Corp., 554 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
108. Id. at 596-97.
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that they were hot, and the contractor's supervisor knew of the exis-
tence of hot lines in the building and especially those lines [in the area
of the accident]. '"109 The appellate court affirmed the summary judg-
ment in favor of Champion.
2. Dangerous Exterior Conditions
I
In Sullivan v. Silver Palm Prop., Inc.," 0 the Florida Supreme
Court determined that the owner of property from which subterranean
roots protrude will incur no liability for damages from those roots. An
automobile went out of control on a bumpy road. Roots from Austra-
lian pine trees on Silver Palm's property caused the bumps in the road,
and a passenger in the car, Sullivan, sued Silver Palm for her injuries.
The trial court allowed the case against Silver Palm to reach the jury.
The Third District Court reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court,
hearing the case as a matter of great public interest, affirmed."' It
quoted extensively from the lower court's opinion, stressing the distinc-
tion between unobservable root growth and obvious danger from over-
hanging limbs and vision-obstructing shrubbery. The court noted that
Florida has now adopted a rule of law consistent with that of several
sister states.""
Unlike Sullivan, Dawson v. Ridgley"' presented the case of a
landowner maintaining an entrance to a public road in such a way that
a telephone pole partially obstructed the view of the road by exiting
motorists. In leaving the defendant's shopping center, motorists would
have their view of the street partially blocked by a concrete telephone
pole which did not lie on the property. Dawson, a passenger on a mo-
torcycle travelling on a public road adjacent to the shopping center,
suffered injuries in an accident caused by a car leaving the shopping
109. Id. at 598. Judge Smith, in dissent, felt the warning inadequate under the
circumstances, particularly because Champion's contact person "did not know the loca-
tion of the proper switch and ... made no effort to seek the assistance of other Cham-
pion personnel who did know." Id. at 599 (Smith, J., dissenting).
110. 558 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1990), aftg Silver Palm Prop., Inc. v. Sullivan, 541
So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also Richmond, 1988 Tort Survey, supra
note 23, at 1270-71.
111. Sullivan, 558 So. 2d at 410. The question certified read as follows: "Does a
landowner have a duty to retard the subterranean root growth of trees which are lo-
cated adjacent to a public right of way?" Id.
112. See id. at 411.
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center and striking the motorcycle. The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed." 4 Although the landowner might owe a duty of rea-
sonable care to business invitees, the duty does not extend to those
travelling along an adjacent public road. 115
In Aventura Mall Venture v. Olson,"' the Third District Court of
Appeal held that maintaining a normal sidewalk curb without painting
it to distinguish it from the adjacent roadway does not constitute an act
of negligence which would subject a landowner to liability to a business
invitee. Olson fell when stepping off a sidewalk curb adjacent to the
Aventura Mall. The mall had not painted the curb, and at trial Olson
introduced evidence that other malls in the same county with similar
curbs had painted the curbs yellow to warn of the difference in levels.
The jury found for Olson, but on appeal the Third District reversed." 7
Undeniably, a landowner owes a duty to business invitees to warn
them of latent or concealed dangers. On the other hand, a landowner
owes no duty to warn of an overt danger. Since nothing obstructed Ol-
son's view, the normal curb presented nothing more than a danger she
could have easily observed. As one early Florida case held, raised curbs
adjacent to sidewalks are a common instance of life in the United
States, and people should not need warning of their location.",8 The
Aventura Mall court reasoned that "[t]o hold that an ordinary side-
walk curb, without more, is inherently dangerous would make every
municipality and business establishment the virtual insurer of the
safety of every pedestrian. ' 19
As noted earlier,12 0 Florida courts have begun to hold that the act
of the plaintiff, while perhaps not serving as a defense to a cause of
action in negligence, will act as a superseding intervening cause to cut
off liability stemming from the defendant's negligence. This concept
also found its way into the jurisprudence of premises liability. In Ruiz
114. The court, however, reversed the summary judgment ir a suit brought
against Ridgley by the driver of the car which was leaving his property. The driver
"was, without dispute, a business invitee of the defendant landowner at the time of the
subject accident . . . ." Id. at 625.
115. Id. at 624-25.
116. 561 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
117. Id. at 319-20.
118. See Bowles v. Elkes Pontiac Co., 63 So. 2d 769, 772 (Fla. 1952).
119. Aventura Mall, 561 So. 2d at 321.
120. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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v. Westbrooke Lake T-Iomes, Inc.,121 a young boy, playing tag on a set
of monkey bars, jumped from one bar to another and broke his collar-
bone when he failed to catch the second bar. He sued the owner of the
property on which the monkey bars were situated, arguing negligence
in ma.intenance of the apparatus. The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed. 22
The Ruiz court pointed out that cases from Florida and other ju-
risdictions consistently hold that where children suffer injuries from ob-
jects on real property, and they have acted in a way to misuse the ob-
jects, the owner of the property will incur no liability to them.
In other words, whatever negligence there may have been on the
part of the landowner, the negligence of the child superseded it and
became, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the child's in-
jury. Applying this to Ruiz, although faulty maintenance was al-
leged, this is of no consequence, as the proximate cause of Dennis'
injuries was that of his own careless attempt to jump from the
monkey bar to the slide.123
Indeed, the court specifically points out that it adopts the causation
analysis to avoid the removal of the strict bar to recovery created by




Florida courts this past term turned their attention to when the
statute of limitations should begin to run in medical malpractice ac-
tions. The Florida Supreme Court noted that the statutory period com-
121. 559 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
122. Id. at 1173.
123. Id. at 1174. Of particular interest is the court's dicta indicating that "liabil-
ity will not lie where the child's own act, rather than an alleged insufficiency of super-
vision, is the sole cause of the injury." Id. (emphasis supplied). The court thus suggests
that the case may be taken from the jury even when the plaintiff might argue that, but
for the negligent supervision, the child would not have been allowed to act negligently.
124. Id. at 1174 n.1. Judge Jorgenson's dissent notes his belief that the causation
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mences when the plaintiff first knows either of the negligence of the
defendant or of the injury itself.125 Subsequent to an operation to re-
move polyps in his colon, Shapiro began to lose his eyesight. Less than
three months after the operation, in December of 1979, doctors diag-
nosed Shapiro as blind. In January, 1982, Shapiro received the opinion
of another physician that Dr. Barron, who removed the polyps, had
caused Shapiro's blindness when he neglected to give Shapiro antibiot-
ics prior to the operation. In late January of 1982, Shapiro sued Bar-
ron, who moved for summary judgment, arguing that Shapiro insti-
tuted the suit more than two years after the cause of action accrued.
1 26
The trial court granted the motion but the Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed. 127 Accepting the case on conflict certiorari with its
earlier decision in Nardone v. Reynolds,'28 the Florida Supreme Court
reversed.
Nardone concerned an earlier, four-year, statute of limitations.
After a series of operations, a young boy left the hospital comatose,
blind, and with irreversible brain damage. More than four years later,
his parents sued for medical malpractice. The Florida Supreme Court
held the case time-barred. The plaintiff in Shapiro argued that the new
statute of limitations meant Nardone no longer governed. The court
disagreed. The consequences of surgery were immediately apparent,
and the plaintiff had constant and total access to all medical records.
As to the argument that the legislature's enactment of a new statute
meant Nardone was no longer good precedent, the court concluded:
While the current statute does not say that the cause of action oc-
curs at the time of the injury, neither did the statute under consid-
eration in Nardone. In fact, it could be argued that by using the
word "incident" the legislature envisioned that there would be
some factual circumstances in which the statute would begin to run
before either the negligence or the injury became known.129
125. Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990).
126. The statute in effect read: "An action for medical malpractice shall be com-
menced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or
within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered
with the exercise of due diligence. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1979).
127. Shapiro v. Barron, 538 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
128. 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976).
129. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1321. Accord, Jackson v. Georgeopolous, 552 So. 2d
215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Justice Shaw, however, dissented in Barron, as he
believed the term "incident" applied only to the negligent act and not to its conse-
quences as well. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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However, a First District Court of Appeal opinion pointed out that
regardless of when the statute should begin to run, the start can be
delayed if the physician in some way prevents the plaintiff from discov-
ering either the injury or its cause. 130 Dr. Drylie performed a surgical
procedure in October of 1982 to relieve Martin's urological problems.
Unfortunately, Martin had difficulty walking, which Drylie told her
was due to positioning of her body during surgery. Drylie assured her
the problems with her leg were temporary and she should suffer no
permanent injury as a result. In December of 1982, Martin's family
doctor told her Drylie was at fault for the problems With her leg, but
Martin continued to see Drylie until August of 1983, when a colleague
of Drylie's told her nothing further could be done for her leg. In March
of 1985, Martin sued Drylie for malpractice. Drylie moved for sum-
mary judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the district
court reversed: "[A] fact issue was created when Dr. Drylie continued
to treat her and assure her that the condition of her leg was only tem-
porary and would presumably clear up with the passage of time."13'
B. Other Professions
As it did with medical malpractice, the Florida Supreme Court
considered a case involving the statute of limitations applicable to pro-
fessional negligence generally. 132 In an action for negligent preparation
of and advice regarding a tax return by an accountant, the plaintiff
brought suit more than two years from the date the Internal Revenue
Service issued a Notice of Deficiency, but less than two years from the
date of an order by the United States Tax Court determining the mat-
ter."' Believing that the statute of limitations began to run on the
same date as the Notice of Deficiency, the trial court granted the ac-
countant's motion for summary judgment. The Third District Court of
Appeal disagreed and reversed.13 4 On conflict certiorari, the Florida
130. Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
131. Id. at 1288. The court also disagreed with Drylie's contention that he
should have been granted summary judgment as an employee of the state at the time of
treating Martin. The court held that the case presented the factual issue of whether
Drylie was wearing two hats - state employee as a teaching physician and private
treating physician - and that the jury must determine which of the hats Drylie was
wearing when treating Martin.
132. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (1983).
133. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990).
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Supreme Court agreed that the statute did not begin to run until the
final order by the Tax Court.
Undeniably, the Lanes had reason to know of the malpractice by
their accountants at the time they received the I.R.S. notice. However,
in contesting the assessment of deficiency, the Lanes had to adopt the
position that the return in question was correct. If the statute of limita-
tions began to run when they received the notice, they would then have
to pursue their malpractice action at the same time they contested the
I.R.S. deficiency assessment. According to the Florida Supreme Court,
Such a course would have placed them in the wholly untenable po-
sition of having to take directly contrary positions in these two ac-
tions. In the tax court, the Lanes would be asserting that the de-
duction Peat Marwick advised them to take was proper, while they
would simultaneously argue in a circuit court malpractice action
that the deduction was unlawful and that Peat Marwick's advice
was malpractice. To require a party to dssert these two legally in-
consistent positions in order to maintain a cause of action for pro-
fessional malpractice is illogical and unjustified.135
The court seems to have created a conflict with its medical mal-
practice determination that the statute started running for medical
malpractice when the plaintiff knew either of the injury or of the negli-
gence. 13 6 However, the court adroitly avoided this conflict by noting
that the Lanes' action in prosecuting the appeal from the I.R.S. deter-
mination of deficiency meant they did not have notice of the negligence
of Peat, Marwick: "Until the tax court determination, both the Lanes
and Peat Marwick believed the accounting advice was correct; conse-
quently, there was no injury."'13 7
Like the Florida Supreme Court in First Florida Bank, 38 lower
Florida courts turned their attention to questions of privity in cases in-
volving professionals. The first of these, decided without the benefit of
the First Florida Bank decision, reached the same conclusion. Athans'
daughter, Nickitas, sought assistance of counsel to sell a parcel of land
App. 1989). The Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Second Dis-
trict's opinion in Sawyer v. Earle, 541 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cause
dismissed, 545 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1989).
135. Peat, Marwick, 565 So. 2d at 1326.
136. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
137. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., 565 So. 2d at 1326.
138. 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990). See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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which Athans owned.13 9 She retained James Soble, and Soble dealt ex-
clusively with her, although he knew that Athans owned the property.
Having found a buyer, Soble drafted a contract for sale of the prop-
erty, providing that notice to seller go to "Nicholas Athans c/o Irene J.
Nickitas," and providing for a deposit which Soble would retain as es-
crow agent. The buyer paid the deposit, but the sale fell through and
Soble lost the deposit. Athans sued Soble in a malpractice action to
recover the amount of the deposit, and Soble moved to dismiss the ac-
tion based on lack of privity. The trial court granted the motion, but
the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.
In his deposition, Soble admitted knowing Athans was the true
owner of the property. In any event, ample documentary evidence bol-
sters the conclusion that Soble knew Nickitas was acting for Athans.
Accordingly, "the legal services . . . rendered were on [Athans'] be-
half."' 40 The Second District Court thus seems to have avoided the is-
sue of privity by looking to traditional agency principles, although it
stops short of fully discussing the issue. Nickitas acted on Athans' be-
half in engaging Soble, and thus acted as Athans' agent. Since Soble
knew of Athans' true ownership of the property, and knew of the
agency between Nickitas and Athans, Athans as a disclosed principal
of Nickitas had every right to sue on the contract. 4'
The same concept that knowledge of the affected party will defeat
privity supports the Fourth District Court of Appeal per curiam opin-
ion in a legal malpractice case.' 42 Satchell prepared Rosenstone's will,
which allegedly did not adequately convey Rosenstone's wishes as to
the disposition of his property. Rosenstone's wife sued Satchell, claim-
ing alternatively that she was a client as well as her husband or that
Satchell knew that Rosenstone intended for her to benefit from the will.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the com-
plaint, noting that established law holds that "an attorney may be held
liable for breach of his duties to one who engages his services or to one
who he knows is the intended beneficiary.''143
139. Athans v. Soble, 553 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1-989).
140. Id. at 1362.
141. Id.
142. Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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IV. STRICT LIABILITY
A. Dangerous Activities and Instrumentalities
Florida courts have consistently adhered to the traditional rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher 14  and held owners of property strictly liable for
harm to adjacent property from non-normal usage of their own land.145
However, Florida courts have rarely received the opportunity to define
what will constitute a non-normal usage. In Midyette v. Madison,146
the Florida Supreme Court considered damage caused by smoke from a
deliberately-set brush fire which obscured vision on an adjacent public
highway. The trial court had granted the motion for summary judg-
ment of the landowner, Midyette, on the grounds that lie could not
incur vicarious liability for the acts of the independent contractor he
hired to clear his land. The First District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the independent contractor exception would not apply
where the principal hired the agent to perform an inherently dangerous
activity, and that burning brush was such an activity. 47 Granting cer-
tiorari to review a question of great public interest, the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed.
The court initially determined that an activity is one of inherent
danger when, "[a]s is self-evident, all parties . . . are on notice as to its
dangerous propensities.' 48 Setting a fire constitutes a dangerous activ-
ity, and just as fire creates a danger from burning, so does it create a
danger from the smoke it engenders. Accordingly, Midyette had con-
tracted for an activity involving inherent danger, and was vicariously
liable for the automobile accident caused by the blowing smoke.'49
However, the court refused to hold that Midyette would have been
strictly liable for the burning. It needed to go no farther to impose
vicarious liability than to find that the smoke from the fire constituted
an inherent danger, much as an automobile is a dangerous instrumen-
tality. "[A] danger that is merely 'inherent' does not give rise to strict
144. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), 1861-1873 All E.R. 1.
145. See, e.g., Bunyak v. Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The Second District Court of Appeal held a dairy strictly liable
when a liquified manure pond overflowed to adjacent property, damaging existing crops
and future arability of the soil, in addition to causing other unpleasant results.
146. 559 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1990).
147. Madison v. Midyette, 541 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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liability."150 The court merely sent the case back to the trial court for a
determination of whether the person burning brush acted negligently.
If he did not, Midyette would not incur liability for his acts.15 1
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court has again refused an op-
portunity to clarify what acts will expose a person to strict liability for
their consequences. It continues to elaborate on the middle ground of
"inherent" danger, however, and this may well lead to semantic confu-
sion. Acts of inherent danger expose the person instigating them to vi-
carious liability for the negligence of the actor, as the negligence of the
user of a dangerous instrumentality exposes the owner 152 to vicarious
liability to injured third parties.5 3
B. Animals
Floridians owning dogs may avoid statutorily-imposed liability for
harm their pets might cause by posting "bad dog" signs on their prop-
erty.154 Porter owned a junkyard, on which he maintained guard
dogs. 5 On the fence surrounding the yard he had posted four "Bad
Dog" signs immediately adjacent to the entrance gate. Registe, a Hai-
tian immigrant, could neither read nor speak English. He claims he
went to the junkyard, did not see the signs, and entered the yard. 56
Even if he had seen the signs, he would not have understood them.
Porter's dogs attacked and injured Registe, and he sued Porter. The
trial court grant Porter's motion for summary judgment. Registe ap-
150. Id. at 1128 n.2 (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 1128 n.3.
152. The owner of a vehicle leased on a long-term basis, however, will not be
vicariously liable for the negligence of the user. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Almon,
559 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1990); Kottmeier v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 561 So.
2d 1366 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Folmar v. Young, 560 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Raynor v. De La Nuez, 558 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 558 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
153. The lower Florida courts were not silent in this area during the past year.
The Second District Court of Appeal added forklifts driven on a public highway to the
growing list of "dangerous instrumentalities," noting that if a golf cart belongs on the
list, so does "this larger, four-wheel vehicle with protruding steel tusks ... " Harding
v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
154. FLA. STAT. § 764.04 (1989).
155. Registe v. Porter, 557 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
156. The court noted that Porter's witnesses conclusively established "existence
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pealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.
The court held that where a sign clearly and prominently displays
the warning of the presence of a dog on premises, it satisfies the statu-
tory demands. 157 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has noted in
dicta that in a given case the plaintiff had actual notice of the presence
of a dog on property,158 the court has never actually held. the statute
demands the visitor to the property receive actual notice. According to
the court, the statute itself merely demands that the words posted be
"easily readable," and this means "[c]apable of being read easily; legi-
ble.' 1 59 Accordingly, the statute requires "a sign that is capable of be-
ing read and is not a requirement that any possible victim of a dog-bite
be 'capable of reading' the sign."' 60
The court did note the Fifth District Court of Appeal's earlier de-
cision in Flick v. Malino,'6' which held that a sign would not protect a
dog owner from a suit by a young child incapable of reading its lan-
guage. However, the court held the inability of a child to read the
words not analagous to the inability of an adult to comprehend the
words when conspicuously posted in English:
If that were the case . . it would force a return to the common
law to determine the respective rights and duties of the parties be-
cause no dog owner could be expected to post a sign in the particu-
lar language of every conceivable victim. We do not believe that to
have been the legislative intent.162
C. Products Liability
The Third District Court of Appeal determined that the manufac-
turer of a product does not incur strict liability for injuries to a worker
dismantling the product after its useful life has passed, even when the
product contains highly toxic materials.6 3 Westinghouse manufactured
transformers, using valuable metals as well as PCB's.6 4 Florida Power
157. Registe, 557 So. 2d at 215.
158. Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney, 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984).
159. Registe, 557 So. 2d at 216 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New College Ed. 1979)).
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. 374 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
162. Registe, 557 So. 2d at 215-16.
163. High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 559 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
164. PCB's, or "polychlorinated biphenyls," are highly toxic materials contained
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& Light purchased the transformers and at the end of their useful life
sold them to a scrap metal salvage dealer. His employee, High, disman-
tled the transformers, seeking to salvage the metals used by Westing-
house to make the transformers. In the course of dismantling, High
poured the liquid containing the PCB's on the ground and received in-
juries when the liquid came in contact with his body. High sued West-
inghouse, and the trial court granted Westinghouse's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.165
The court held that "[w]hile the transformers were sealed and in-
tact there was no harm. . . .Westinghouse's product as it had origi-
nally been sold to FP&L, for practical purposes, had ceased to exist at
the time the alleged injuries occurred. ' 166 Although the court might
have based its decision on the termination of the useful life of the prod-
uct, instead it chose to affirm the summary judgment "based upon a
substantial change in the product from the time it left the manufac-
turer's control .... ,,167 The defect accordingly stemmed from the
transformation of the product, rather than from its manufacture. In
resting its decision on these grounds, the court paid lip service to cases
from federal district courts holding that manufacturers could not fore-
see salvage operations which involved the dismantling of their prod-
ucts. 6 ' However, the court elected not to adopt foreseeability as its
ratio decidendi.
In Knox v. Delta International Machinery Corp.,' the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in a per curiam decision, reiterated the rule that
manufacturers who supply their products with safety devices incur no
liability to those injured by the product after the device has been re-
moved, even though the manufacturer may not have warned against its
removal. Delta manufactured a jointer machine with a safety guard,
but the guard could be easily removed. It did not warn against removal
of the guard, and Knox used the machine after the guard had been
removed. Knox lost two fingers, and sued Delta. The trial court granted
Delta's motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court af-
firmed: "[A] manufacturer is, as a matter of law, under no duty to
within electrolytic fluids in the transformer. Id. at 229.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 228.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Pa. 1987);
Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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produce a fail-safe product, so long as the product poses no unreasona-
ble dangers for consumer use."' 170 The jointer machine, when it left
Delta's factory, was perfectly safe. Delta had no duty to prevent users
from removing those design elements which contributed to its safety.
V. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Over the years, Florida's protective attitude regarding causes of
action for emotional distress has consistently withstood numerous chal-
lenges. Most recently, with its decision in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
King,'' the Florida Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to al-
lowing damages for emotional distress not stemming from physical in-
jury only in restricted circumstances. Improper inspection and mainte-
nance caused engine failure on an Eastern flight on which King was a
passenger. Although at one point all three engines failed to operate and
the passengers prepared to ditch, the crew managed to restart one en-
gine and the plane limped to a safe landing. King sued Eastern, alleg-
ing reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress and after
judgment for Eastern on the pleadings, the Third District 'Court of Ap-
peal reversed. 1 2 Accepting the case on conflict certiorari,7 3 the Florida
Supreme Court reversed.
Florida recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which re-
quires the defendant act in an "extreme and outrageous" manner
before liability will attach. 4 King's pleadings alleged Eastern's
mechanics had failed to discover a missing O-ring in the engines, which
caused them to fail. Additionally, King alleged that Eastern mechanics
had failed to discover missing O-rings on at least a dozen prior occa-
sions. However, as the court noted, these allegations at best amount to
claims of mere negligence. The court found that Eastern's conduct did
not rise to the level of outrageousness needed to support the tort
170. Id.
171. 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990).
172. King v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
173. The court noted conflict with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467
So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985), and Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla.
1985).
174. "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress .... " RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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claimed by King.'7 5
Chief Justice Ehrlich, in his concurring opinion, noted that King's
complaint did not even allege adequate facts to support a cause of ac-
tion for negligent infliction of emotional distress.1 76 Although Florida
no longer limits recovery for the tort to those instances in which the
distress accompanies physical impact, the plaintiff seeking to recover
must still demonstrate "a clearly demonstrable physical impairment
[accompanies] or occur[s] within a short time after the negligently in-
flicted psychic injury.' 7 7 King failed to demonstrate either impact or
resulting physical harm.
Also noteworthy is Justice Barkett's brief concurrence:
I concur in the Court's judgment that prior decisions would bar
relief for the intentional infliction of mental distress in this case. I
believe, however, that persons who have suffered great mental
anguish through the extreme negligence of a tortfeasor, such as
Eastern's in this case, should be permitted a remedy. 1 8
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted last year,7 9 the Florida Supreme Court continues on a
relatively even keel, favoring on an overall basis neither defendants nor
plaintiffs. During the past year, however, Florida judges have shown an
increasing distaste for awarding damages to litigants who, having vol-
untarily placed themselves in existing positions of danger, seek to re-
cover damages from those who created the danger. Blocked by prece-
dent from dismissing these claims based on the defense of assumption
of risk, Florida courts at all levels have instead viewed the actions of
the plaintiffs as the single effective cause of their harm. Accordingly,
they have found as a matter of law that the negligence of the defendant
did not cause the injuries of which the plaintiff complains.
In this instance, what seems an end run around an unworkable
rule instead mirrors the philosophy underlying tort law. Plaintiffs re-
cover from others for their injuries only because the others have acted
175. King, 557 So. 2d at 578.
176. Id. at 579 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 580 (Barkett, J., concurring).
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in a socially irresponsible manner, and because the irresponsibility has
led directly to the harm the plaintiffs have suffered. Danger caused by
irresponsibility does not produce harm to people when they have recog-
nized the danger and, confronting it without compulsion, suffered the
type of harm they could have anticipated the danger would produce.
The irresponsibility has done no more than give people the potential for
harming themselves, and in this light, courts cannot fairly expect one
who merely establishes a potential for voluntary injury to recompense
those who willingly take the risk of harm on themselves.
The stand of Florida courts on this issue underlies a more signifi-
cant truth about the development of Florida tort law. Although at
times courts in our state may seek to bend the fabric of the law in an
effort to award damages to an injured person,8 0 the law will ultimately
spring back to comport with its underlying theory. This resilience
shows that Florida courts have maintained a keen sense of the theory of
law, even when the equities of the case might seem to militate other-
wise. Unfortunately, as an English jurist noted years ago, "[h]ard
cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law."''
Fortunately, Florida's courts have continued to resist the temptation to
alter the law to permit unjustified recovery in the isolated case.
180. See, e.g., King, 557 So. 2d at 580 (Barkett, J., concurring), discussed supra
note 178 and accompanying text.
181. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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